By Mohamed AG Ahmedou
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—grouped within the Alliance of Sahel States (ESA)—are, according to Moscow, the “vanguard” in the fight against trans-African terrorism. This, in any case, was the message conveyed by Dmitry Chumakov, Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, during a meeting of the Security Council.
” To achieve long-term stabilization, the international community must provide collective support to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as these countries have unwittingly become the vanguard of the fight against trans-African terrorist groups. Attempts by foreign powers to interfere in the region’s affairs are counterproductive.”
A calibrated speech, but one that raises questions: why was this message relayed not by the Russian embassies in Bamako, Niamey, or Ouagadougou, but by the Russian embassy… in Senegal? And why this conciliatory tone when the Russian military presence on the ground in the central Sahel is accused of bloody atrocities against the nomadic civilian populations—Tuaregs, Arabs, Fulani, Soninke, and Dogon—already among the most deprived in the world, and themselves victims of the religious terrorism they are supposed to combat?
Communication from Dakar, not from the heart of the AES
The decision to publish this message via the social media of the Russian embassy in Dakar, rather than those of the representations in Mali, Niger, or Burkina Faso, is not insignificant. Dakar is a regional diplomatic hub, home to several media outlets and international human rights NGOs, and is perceived as a more “neutral” space than the capitals of the SEA.
In Moscow, the discourse on the Sahel is intended to be offensive, with Russia highlighting its security successes and its “anti-imperialist” alliances. In Bamako and Ouagadougou, the tone is more triumphant, mixing sovereignist rhetoric with promises of military and mining cooperation. In Niamey, communication is more discreet, with the Nigerien army remaining cautious in displaying a still-nascent partnership.
In Dakar, however, Moscow has adopted a polite diplomatic stance, oriented toward international public opinion and multilateral institutions. The message is subtly changing: fewer nationalist slogans, more references to multilateralism, debt, and development.
Historical Focus: Russian Strategy in the Central Sahel
The Russian presence in the central Sahel is part of a broader geopolitical context. Since the departure of French and European forces, Moscow has stepped into the security vacuum left by its rivals.
2017-2021: Security cooperation agreements are signed with Mali, then extended to other Sahelian states.
2022-2023: The Wagner Group, already active in the Central African Republic and Sudan, establishes itself in Mali. Its official mission: military training and securing mining areas.
2024: Creation of the Africa Corps, the official heir to Wagner, more institutionalized but using the same networks of men and equipment. Deployments confirmed in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
2025: Cooperation expanded to civil nuclear and energy projects, while maintaining a discreet but effective military presence.
The Russian narrative consists of presenting itself as a “liberating” partner ridding the region of Western influences, while consolidating privileged access to strategic resources (gold, uranium, manganese).
The shadow of mercenaries on civilians
On the ground, the Russian presence is not just about rhetoric. NGO reports, as well as testimonies collected in northern Mali, accuse Russian proxies of being involved in massacres of civilians, particularly among nomadic and sedentary communities in rural areas in the regions of Kayes, Nioro, Nara, Ségou, Timbuktu, Mopti, Douentza, Bandiagara, Kidal, Gao, and Taoudeni.
In Moura, Mali, several hundred people were reportedly executed during a joint Malian-Wagner military operation in 2022. The victims, mostly Fulani, Tuareg, and Arab, were accused of collusion with jihadists—without tangible evidence, according to very reliable local sources with NGO documentation on these crimes.
These populations, already affected by extreme poverty and terrorist attacks, find themselves caught between two fires: jihadist violence on one side, and blind reprisals from local and foreign forces on the other.
Syrian failure as a background
Mr. Chumakov’s speech takes on a particular dimension when compared to Russia’s experience in Syria. For Moscow, Damascus represented a vital geopolitical priority. In the Sahel, investment is less, more opportunistic.
In Syria, Russia has mobilized massive air, naval, and diplomatic resources. In the Sahel, the engagement is primarily ground-based and paramilitary, with local political backbones. The call for “collective support” could therefore mark the beginning of a cautious disengagement, or even a transfer of responsibilities to other actors.
Withdrawal or repositioning?
The question arises: is Russia preparing an early withdrawal from the Sahel? While Syria’s history has demonstrated its ability to endure in difficult terrain, the Sahel does not offer the same strategic value for Moscow. Mineral resources, however attractive, do not necessarily justify a prolonged commitment in the face of an uncontrollable security environment.
The call for multilateralism from Dakar seems as much like an outstretched hand as a desire to share—or delegate—the burden of stabilization.
The underlying reality remains: in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Russia is not just a diplomatic ally. It is a military actor, sometimes clandestine, accused of serious human rights violations, and whose priorities could change faster than its Sahelian partners imagine.
Mohamed AG Ahmedou, Mehari Consulting
10-08-25