Introduction
Since the declaration of Azawad’s independence in 2012, political and military tensions in the region have not ceased. The regional states surrounding Azawad—Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Libya—take different positions based on their geopolitical interests. This report explains the positions of these states based on facts and in-depth analysis.
1. Algeria: A Pivotal and Cautious Role.
Algeria considers itself the largest regional power in North Africa and has a long border with Mali, making it a key player in Azawad.
Algeria has adopted a position in support of “the unity of Mali” and has clearly opposed any move for Azawad’s independence, fearing that separatist movements would spread to its territory, especially in the Kabylie region.
Algeria has used its diplomatic influence to brake peace agreements, such as the 2015 Algiers Agreement, but has not provided real support for the Azawadis’ demands for independence.
It hosted several rounds of negotiations between Mali and the Azawad movements, but it always tended towards “integration” solutions within Mali, not complete independence.
It supports intelligence agencies within Azawad to monitor the situation, and it has spies in the region to spy on the movements of the Azawad leaders.
Analysis:
→ Algeria does not want Azawad independence, but it does not want a strong Mali either. It prefers to keep the region weak so that it can intervene and influence as it pleases.
2. Morocco: Pragmatic neutrality.
Morocco does not oppose Azawad independence, but it does not support it openly either.
Morocco focuses on economic and diplomatic relations with Mali and the Sahel countries, and maintains a channel of communication with Azawad leaders without direct intervention.
Morocco has not made any negative intervention against Azawad independence, unlike Algeria, and has not prevented Azawad political activity on its territory.
Morocco sees Azawad as not posing a threat to it, unlike Algeria, which sees its independence as a strategic danger.
Analysis:
→ Morocco prefers to remain neutral and not get involved, but leaves the door open to dealing with Azawad in the future.
3. Mauritania: The dual position.
Mauritania has relations with Azawad, but does not officially support independence.
Mauritania hosts a large number of Azawad refugees, but at the same time works with Mali and Algeria to prevent the escalation of any independence movements.
Its security services occasionally arrest Azawad activists or hand over wanted persons to Mali.
However, it is considered a haven for some Azawad leaders who find it difficult to move around the region due to regional pressures.
Analysis:
→ Mauritania does not support Azawad independence, but it is not a direct enemy of it. Its position is based on balancing security interests and regional pressures.
4. Niger: The security threat first.
Niger completely rejects Azawad independence, fearing that the secessionist contagion will spread to the Tuareg within its territory.
It supports Mali militarily and security-wise and considers itself a partner in the fight against the “separatists”, although its position is not as strong as that of Algeria.
It cooperates with France in intelligence to monitor Azawad movements.
Analysis:
→ Niger considers any independence for Azawad a threat to its national unity, and is therefore a partner of Mali in suppressing Azawad ambitions.
5. Chad: the regional military power.
Chad is a key member of the G5 Sahel group, and is more interested in fighting terrorism than in the issue of Azawad independence.
Despite the presence of Chadian forces in the region, it does not intervene directly in the Azawad issue.
Chad follows France’s policy in the region, and therefore it cannot be expected to support Azawad independence at the present time.
Analysis:
→ Chad is a military power in the region but is not a major player in the Azawad issue.
6. Burkina Faso: The country that changed its position.
In recent years, with the rise of Russian influence in Burkina Faso, it has begun to take more independent positions from France.
However, its official position remains supportive of the unity of Mali, for fear of the instability spreading to it.
It has no direct intervention in the Azawad file, but it cooperates on security matters with Niger and Mali against the armed Azawad movements.
Analysis:
→ Burkina Faso has not shown a decisive position towards Azawad, but it tends to reject any separatist movement due to its fragile security situation.
7. Libya: Chaos and unintended neutrality
Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has become an unstable country, and it does not have a clear position towards the independence of Azawad.
Some Libyan factions sympathize with the Tuaregs, while others see them as a threat due to their previous relationship with Gaddafi.
There are Libyan Tuaregs fighting in the ranks of the Azawad movements, but the Libyan state itself is not an active party in the issue.
Analysis:
→ Libya is not a major player in the Azawad issue due to its internal chaos.
Conclusion: Who is the friend and who is the enemy?
Algeria: The first enemy of Azawad independence, uses spies and covert tactics to thwart it.
Niger: Totally rejects independence and supports Mali against any separatist movements.
Mauritania: Seemingly neutral but cooperates with Mali on security matters.
Morocco: Neutral but does not prevent Azawad activity on its territory.
Chad, Burkina Faso, and Libya: Not directly active in the Azawad issue.
Conclusion:
Azawad stands almost alone in its battle, without clear regional support, but with clear Algerian and Nigerien hostility. If the Azawadis want to achieve independence, they will have to rely on themselves and build new alliances outside the region, especially with global powers that may have an interest in undermining Algerian and Nigerien influence in the Sahel.
Azawad Freedom Voice 05-03-25
Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) The Azawad movements united since nov 30-2024
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