After hearing so many accusations of “terrorism” against the Azawad army—an accusation that only began after the boat attack, I’ve already done a lot of research, read reports and analyses, and formed my own opinion based on these international analyses. Malians never respond because they know it’s pure propaganda.
In the 21st century, no lie becomes truth simply by being repeated over and over again, thanks to the availability of information from reputable sources. Even Goebbels wouldn’t be successful these days, when all the skeletons are coming out of the digital closet.
But seeing the Russians (on the Wagner pages) mention the beloved Tinariwen veterans—brave, talented, and respected people worldwide—in this filth, (lies about them)I thought they had crossed the acceptable line. And I decided to update this thread on Grok, X’s AI.
Here’s part of the long compilation Grok made in my language. The AI has only translated a summary, as the compilation is very extensive. Anyone who wishes can do so in their own language.
Investigation into Responsibility for the Attack on the “Tombouctou” Boat.
“Tombouctou” on September 7, 2023, on the Niger River in Mali remains inconclusive, with no significant public updates as of May 2025.
The Malian military junta, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, promised to identify and punish those responsible, but no detailed findings have been released.
The government officially attributed the attack to the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group, which claimed a simultaneous attack on a military base in Bamba. It was not specified exactly how many died in each assault, but according to international reports the assaults were claimed by JNIM.
However, the junta and pro-government social media accounts also raised suspicions against a Tuareg-led separatist group, then known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA), despite a lack of evidence and the group’s denial of involvement.
Note that the CSP-DPA, previously called the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), was incorrectly referred to as CMA by some media, including potentially AFP, after its rebranding to CSP-DPA in 2022-2023.
By early 2025, the group adopted the name Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).
Context of Accusations Against the CSP-DPA (Later FLA)
The CSP- DPA, a coalition of non-jihadist Tuareg and Arab groups, seeks greater autonomy for the Azawad region and was a signatory to the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement under its former name, CMA. It adheres to international laws of war, avoiding civilian targets, as already noted.
By September 2023, the group was operating as the CSP- DPA, having withdrawn from peace talks with the junta in late 2022 due to the government’s failure to implement the agreement.
The junta’s accusations against the CSP- DPA appear politically motivated rather than evidence-based, likely exploiting the group’s historical name (CMA) and regional presence to deflect from security failures.
The accusations rest on the following speculative points:
- Broad “Terrorist” Label: The junta labels all opposition groups, including the CSP- DPA and jihadists like JNIM, as “terrorists,” blurring distinctions to justify military operations and delegitimize the Azawadian revolutionary fighters.
- This narrative was evident in the junta’s response to later incidents, such as a February 2025 attack where the army called FLA fighters “terrorists.”
- Speculation in Pro-Government Media:
- Pro-junta social media and local media suggested CSP- DPA involvement due to its influence in the Timbuktu region, which was under JNIM blockade but also a separatist stronghold. These claims lack forensic evidence or direct testimonies and were likely amplified to undermine the Azawadian revolutionary fighters amid the peace process’s collapse.
- The CSP- DPA (later FLA) denied involvement, emphasizing that its operations target military forces, not civilians, and that the boat attack was inconsistent with its goals.
Confusion with Jihadist Groups:
- The junta may have capitalized on historical ties between Tuareg rebels and jihadists. The CMA (predecessor to CSP- DPA) briefly allied with Islamist groups in 2012 before splitting due to ideological differences. This outdated association was likely used to cast suspicion on the CSP- DPA, despite its non-jihadist stance.
- The attack’s use of missiles and heavy weaponry aligns more with JNIM’s tactics, as seen in later JNIM attacks in Bamako in September 2024. The CSP- DPA ‘s military capabilities, while enhanced by alleged external support (e.g., Ukrainian drones in 2024), were not linked to civilian attacks.
- Allegations of External Support:
- The junta accused Algeria of backing the CSP- DPA, particularly after a Malian drone was shot down in Tinzawatène, a CSP- DPA-controlled area, in 2024. These diplomatic tensions fueled claims that the CSP- DPA could conduct sophisticated attacks, though no evidence ties this to the boat incident.
- Reports of CSP- DPA collaboration with Ukraine against Russian mercenaries in 2024 surfaced, but these postdate the boat attack and focus on military targets, not civilian vessels.
Lack of Concrete Evidence
- No Forensic Findings: No public reports detail wreckage analysis, weaponry, or testimonies linking the CSP- DPA to the attack. The junta’s investigation has not provided updates, shifting focus to military operations against “terrorists.”
- Witness Accounts: Survivors described the attack as “singular,” with missile and gunfire intensity consistent with JNIM or EIGS tactics, not CSP- DPA ‘s military engagements.
- Improbable Motivation: Attacking civilians would undermine the CSP- DPA ‘s pursuit of international legitimacy and autonomy, making JNIM the more likely culprit given its history of indiscriminate violence.
Junta’s Motivations
The junta’s accusations against the CSP- DPA (later FLA) serve strategic purposes:
- Delegitimizing the CSP- DPA: Linking the CSP- DPA to civilian attacks undermines its role in the Algiers Agreement, justifying the junta’s suspension of peace talks and military escalation.
- Deflecting Criticism: The attack highlighted the junta’s failure to secure river routes, and blaming the CSP- DPA alongside JNIM shifts focus from these shortcomings.
- Unified Threat Narrative: Labeling the CSP- DPA as “terrorists” aligns with the junta’s rhetoric, seen in 2025 statements, to consolidate support from allies like Russia and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Current Status:
As of May 2025, the investigation remains stalled, with no public progress. The junta’s focus on operations against groups like the FLA, as seen in drone strikes killing civilians in Tinzaouaten, suggests impunity persists. Human Rights Watch’s 2025 report notes ongoing failures to investigate abuses in Mali, reinforcing this trend.
The junta’s accusations against the CSP- DPA (later FLA) for the “Tombouctou” attack lack evidence and rely on speculation and political narratives. The group, incorrectly called CMA by some media like AFP after its 2022-2023 rebranding to CSP- DPA, adheres to international laws and has no motive to target civilians.
JNIM remains the most likely perpetrator, given its tactics and regional activity. DPA ‘s potential use of “CMA” reflects a reporting error amid Mali’s complex conflict, where rapid name changes and junta propaganda obscure accurate explosion of gunfire at the beginning of the attack, followed by a sustained barrage of rocket fire lasting 15 minutes.
The attack’s sophistication suggests a level of coordination and firepower consistent with jihadist groups like JNIM, not the CSP- DPA ‘s known operations. The lack of transparency in the investigation, coupled with the junta’s broad “terrorist” label, indicates that accusations against the CSP- DPA /FLA are more about discrediting the CSP- DPA /FLA than establishing responsibility.
Conclusion:
The attack on the “Tombouctou” boat on September 7, 2023, on the Niger River in Mali was claimed by Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a jihadist group affiliated with al-Qaeda. Multiple sources, including a Malian government statement, confirm JNIM’s responsibility for the attack, which killed at least 49 civilians and 15 soldiers. The assault was part of a broader wave of violence, including a simultaneous attack on a military camp in Bamba, and was linked to JNIM’s ongoing blockade of Timbuktu, which restricted movement on roads and waterways.
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) states that the attack against the civilian boat ” Tombouctou” constitutes a war crime.
Liliam Brezinski
Azawad Support Group
“In the 21st century, no lie becomes truth simply by being repeated over and over again”
And if we think about it logically, why would the CSP-DPA attack a passenger boat, which in itself would be completely contrary to its agenda? And which would harm its own interests, namely the independence of Azawad and nothing else? Harming civilians has never been an objective in itself for them. Jnim, on the contrary, as the reports show, had every interest in committing such an attack.
EN_GB 
FR 
AR