Par Mohamed AG AHMEDOU
From rural areas of Timbuktu to Kidal, and throughout central and southern Mali, airstrikes, alleged executions, and bombings targeting civilian populations are on the rise.
Behind the official rhetoric of territorial reconquest by General Assimi Goïta’s regime, the reality on the ground reveals a weakened state, incapable of stabilizing the North and protecting its people, while the Russian partners of the Afrika Korps themselves seem to acknowledge the military failure in Azawad.
Accounts emerging from rural areas of the North paint a picture of a territory gripped by fear, where Tuareg and Arab civilians say they live in constant anguish over airstrikes, arbitrary arrests, and collective reprisals.
A series of deadly incidents in the North:
On Wednesday, May 13, 2026, in the village of Intefouk, near Aguelhok in the Kidal region, Ahmed Ag Alhousseini, nicknamed “Intaka,” was reportedly killed during an operation conducted jointly by the Malian army and Russian elements of the Afrika Korps. According to several local accounts, he was shot at point-blank range while in a pastoral area.
This incident deeply shocked the nomadic communities of northern Mali, where the case quickly became a symbol of violence perceived as indiscriminate against Tuareg civilians.
Barely twenty-four hours later, another tragedy was reported in the Timbuktu region. On Thursday, May 14, a military mission leaving the town of Léré for rural areas reportedly executed two Tuareg men near the village of Sonima, in the commune of Aljounoub, in the Gargando department.
The victims were identified as Irou Ag Hamma Ag Zaybane and Houti Ag Baynana, both from the Tuareg community of Kel Aghazaf in the Timbuktu region.
For many residents of the area, these deaths are not isolated incidents but rather part of a security strategy that has spiraled out of control. In several rural localities in the north, residents now say they are avoiding roads, abandoning their camps, and taking refuge in desert areas far from towns.
Bombings and a climate of terror:
In addition to these alleged executions, bombings have been reported in several sectors of northern Mali, known as Azawad.
According to local sources, airstrikes using microbombs targeted rural areas such as Tintamaghayene, in western Gargando, as well as logistics trucks located north of Bourem.
These vehicles reportedly belong to an associate of the president of the Taoudenit regional council, who is considered supportive of the Malian military transitional government of Assimi Goïta.
Other strikes were also reported in the Kidal region, where civilians say they live in constant fear of military aircraft.
On Saturday, May 17, 2026, a new incident reignited tensions. According to several accounts gathered in the Kidal region, a Sukhoi Su-24 fighter jet used by the Malian army and elements of the Afrika Korps targeted civilian camps located in Talabit and Tadjmart, about 80 kilometers north of the city of Kidal.
The provisional toll reports four wounded, including two women, and the death of a seven-year-old child. The strikes also reportedly caused significant material damage to homes and nomadic camps.
In these desert regions where medical facilities are scarce, the wounded often have to be evacuated hundreds of kilometers in extremely difficult conditions.
The paradox of the official narrative:
This violence comes just days after a public statement by the governor of Timbuktu, Bakoun Konaté, who called for calm and encouraged the return of Tuareg and Arab civilians who had fled the violence perpetrated by Russian mercenaries from Afrika Korps and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMAS) in several areas of northern Mali.
But on the ground, many residents denounce a growing gap between official pronouncements and the security reality experienced daily by local populations.
In several districts of Timbuktu and Kidal, entire families continue to flee their camps for fear of airstrikes or military operations. Some community leaders are now speaking of a “silent exodus” and even of ethnic cleansing of nomadic populations.
This contradiction further undermines the credibility of the Malian transitional authorities, who are accused by their critics of using security concerns to consolidate their political power while the security situation continues to deteriorate.
A war that is now spreading to southern Mali:
Concern is growing, especially as the violence is no longer confined to the north.
On Sunday, May 17, the village of Tené, in the San region of southern Mali, was reportedly targeted by drone strikes that hit a gathering organized for a wedding.
According to several local sources contacted by Méhari Post, at least eight people were killed, including local dignitaries and elected officials. Numerous wounded were reportedly evacuated to the San referral health center.
While the exact circumstances of this strike are still being established, this event is fueling growing concern that the military methods used in the north are gradually spreading to other regions of the country.
For several months, Malian authorities have presented armed drones and Russian military support as essential tools in the fight against jihadist groups. But a growing number of voices are denouncing operations conducted without transparency, without independent investigations, and with dramatic consequences for civilian populations.
The quagmire of a military regime under strain:
Nearly six years after the first military coup in 2020, Mali seems to be sinking deeper into a multidimensional crisis where the militarization of power is failing to restore lasting security or rebuild national trust.
On the contrary, in many regions, accusations of abuses, intercommunal tensions, and population displacements are fueling deep resentment against the transitional authorities and their Russian partners.
Beyond the human tragedy, these repeated military operations against civilians in the Azawad regions primarily reflect a strategic reality that is becoming increasingly difficult for Bamako to conceal.
Despite months of official propaganda surrounding the “reconquest” of the North, the security situation demonstrates that the Malian state is still struggling to maintain lasting control over the vast northern territories.
Even more revealing, several communication channels close to the Russian elements of the Afrika Korps have recently suggested that the objective of fully recapturing Kidal is no longer a priority, or has even become unrealistic under the current circumstances. For many Sahelian observers, this development constitutes an implicit admission of military failure.
Unable to impose political and security stability in the North, General Assimi Goïta’s government now seems to favor a strategy of demonstrating air power, the primary victims of which remain the civilian population.
For many Sahelian observers, the risk now lies in an even deeper rift between the central government and certain peripheral populations, particularly Tuareg, Arab, and Fulani, who feel they are paying the price for a war waged without a clear distinction between civilians and combatants.
In this volatile context, the lack of independent investigations into reported violence and the gradual stifling of the Malian media landscape are contributing to increased tensions and mistrust.
While the authorities in Bamako claim to be fighting for national sovereignty and the stability of the country, many Malians are now wondering: how far can this logic of war lead Mali before the country falls into even deeper fragmentation?
25-05-26